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Abstract 
On 22nd - 23rd April 2016, ‘ENTraNCE’ for Executives 
held its third workshop. The event focused on institutional 
design of National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and 
their enforcement strategies. The workshop was divided into 
four panels, which dealt, respectively, with (i) the pros and 
cons of single- and multi-function competition authorities; 
(ii) advocacy, in particular in the context of the NCA’s right 
to challenge anti-competitive regulations in national courts, 
and comment on draft legislations, (iii) settlements and 
remedies, and (iv) quantification of NCAs’ enforcement and 
the imposition of sanctions.  
The workshop gathered different stakeholders together, 
which included representatives from NCAs, international 
organisations, academia, and industry, as well as law and 
consulting firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively 
debate. While participants agreed on various issues, the 
discussion revealed the need for further research on those 
issues that have not yet been sufficiently explored. This 
policy brief summarises the main points raised during the 
discussion and seeks to stimulate further debate. 
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1. Recent trends: the shift towards 
multifunctional competition authorities 
The institutional design of competition authorities is 
a critical element in competition law and policy. Even 
the finest competition laws become insufficient to 
ensure the attainment of competition goals if they are 
not enforced by appropriately designed institutions. 
The design of competition authorities does matter, 
and it is not surprising that  the  authorities often seem 
to be protective of their  institutional  arrangements. 
During recent years, however, competition authorities 
have been under pressure about how their design 
affects the outcome of their work. Partially due to 
such pressure, there has been a wave of institutional 
reforms that have considerably reshaped the design 
of competition authorities in various countries. 
Recently, different authorities have been merged 
in Finland (January, 2013), the Netherlands (April, 
2013), Spain (October, 2013), and in the UK (April, 
2014).  The overview of institutional designs in 
various jurisdictions clearly shows that they vary 
from country to country. The workshop’s attendees 
agreed that when it comes to the optimal design for 
a competition authority, there is no one-size that fits 
all. 
Institutional changes have usually led to the 
establishment of multifunctional competition 
authorities, ones which merged a competition 
authority with the authorities entrusted with other 
policy functions, such as consumer protection and 
sector regulation. There are also other, although 
less frequently encountered variations, such as the 
combination of powers in the area of competition 
and procurement law. In general, however, the 
integration of competition and consumer authorities 
appears to be the main trend, and, at the same time, 
it seems to be the most efficient one.
Institutional modifications raise a number of 
questions: what is the optimal institutional design? 
How far one can go with integrating different 
functions within the competition authority? How to 
ensure integration and cross-fertilisation across the 
authority? How to prevent silos and unproductive 
rivalry between departments? 
While answers to these questions may depend on 
many variables, the general framework for evaluating 
competition authorities should be based on five 
broad principles. These five principles, referred to 
as ‘LITER’ are: legality, independence, transparency, 
effectiveness and responsibility.1 Legality implies 
that the administrative actions of competition 
authorities should be undertaken in accordance with 
the legislative mandate. Independence, which is an 
essential attribute of effective authorities, refers to 
independence, both from politics and market parties. 
Furthermore, competition authorities have to carry 
out their activities in a transparent and fair manner, 
ensuring sufficient room for consultation and 
stakeholders’ participation. The NCAs interventions 
also have to be effective and efficient, and last but 
not least, the authorities have to be responsible for 
their actions. The conclusion that emerged from 
the discussion is that, irrespectively of the chosen 
institutional setting, the authority must have political 
support in order to carry out its functions effectively 
and efficiently.  
Advantages and disadvantages of multifunctional 
competition authorities
While the attendees agreed that the integration of 
various functions can produce a number of beneficial 
outcomes, they also pointed to the various risks and 
costs that such integration may entail. While some 
of the costs and benefits are likely to arise in respect 
of any type of integration, others will depend on the 
specific functions that are combined.  
Participants agreed that the horizontal integration of 
any two authorities certainly leads to administrative 
cost savings. However, these savings have to be 
weighed against the costs of integration in order 
to determine whether, on balance, the integration 
will produce not just short term savings but, more 
importantly longer term ones also.  
1. Annetje Ottow (2015), Market and Competition Authori-
ties: Good Agency Principles, Oxford University Press.
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Another important advantage of multifunctional 
authorities is that they can be better placed to address 
the problem of staff turnover and a lack of career 
progress. In particular, multifunctional authorities 
offer their employees a possibility to move between 
different departments, which, in turn, may facilitate 
recruitment and the retention of experienced and 
specialised staff.  
Participants also reflected on the ability of a multi-
functional authority to prioritise, which is of 
particular relevance when resources are limited. 
On the one hand, the authority may prioritise by 
simply choosing easier cases. Some participants 
have claimed that consumer cases tend to be easier 
than competition cases, due to increasingly more 
extensive use of economics in the latter. On the 
other hand, the integration of two functions may 
actually impair the authority’s ability to strike the 
right balance between its priorities. This may, for 
example, be the case where the authority has to 
decide how to divide its attention and resources 
between obligatory and more discretionary tasks.  
The integration of various authorities can also give 
the impulse for change in terms of institutional 
culture. While the combination of two or more 
authorities can lead to a ‘culture clash’, it can also 
be beneficial as long as the new authority has a 
clear mission and overarching objectives to which 
different units of the authority can ascribe.  For 
example, in the Netherlands the Independent 
Post and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA 
-  i.e., the telecoms regulator) was initially against 
a merger with the competition authority. To ensure 
that the process of integration went smoothly, the 
competition authority encouraged dialogue, which 
involved employees, and chose the protection of 
consumer welfare as the overarching objective of the 
new Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM). 
Participants agreed that while institutional 
transformations always create some disruption, 
such disruption can be used in a positive way. 
However, as some participants warned, if the 
process of institutional transformation is not swift 
enough, there is a risk that valued staff may leave 
the authority. Finally, the integration of various 
authorities may be seen as being beneficial from the 
business perspective also, since the cost of dealing 
with multiple authorities can be substantially 
reduced.  
While there has been a common understanding that 
the integration of various authorities can produce 
numerous benefits, the participants also stressed 
the importance of identifying the disadvantages 
and of evaluating the costs that integration may 
raise. In particular, an integrated authority may 
lose focus, while its identity may be diluted; 
regulatory competition may be lost; and there can 
also be unproductive rivalry between departments. 
Moreover, within the merged authority, an excessive 
focus may be placed on uniformity, which is not a 
goal in itself.  
Merging competition and consumer protection 
Participants considered that the integration of the 
competition and consumer protection functions 
within one authority is overall beneficial, given 
that these two areas tend to reinforce one another. 
Accordingly, the participants agreed that this kind 
of combination is, in general, the least problematic. 
However, some also stressed that this is not 
completely free from challenges as sometimes both 
policies can clash. It is therefore important to evaluate 
and counterweigh the challenges and benefits that 
may arise, particularly when competition and 
consumer protection functions are integrated under 
one authority.  
Participants acknowledged that an integrated 
authority is likely to benefit from a stronger, more 
unified voice and greater external visibility among 
the public. This, in turn, should facilitate advocacy 
and raise awareness among the public about the 
authority’s mission and activities. Attendees also 
highlighted the importance of the appropriate 
allocation of resources. It was noted also that 
the combination of competition and consumer 
protection functions within one authority has 
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often raised fears that one area would dominate the 
other. Some participants claimed that competition 
enforcement would dominate, since it resonates 
better with the public, while others argued that 
consumer protection would come to the fore, as its 
enforcement is less complex. 
Of course, the fact that the integration of different 
functions raises a specific set of challenges does 
not mean that they necessarily have to materialise. 
For example, when competition and consumer 
protection were integrated in Poland in 1996, some 
of the challenges apparently did not materialise.  
Merging a competition authority with a sectoral 
regulator 
The integration of a competition authority and a 
sectoral regulator within one authority allows for the 
exploitation of various synergies that arise between 
the regulation of network industries characterised 
by the presence of natural monopolies and the 
work of competition authorities. For example, an 
integrated authority may ensure more uniform 
application of some rudimentary concepts, such as 
dominance and significant market power (SMP). 
When the authority is entrusted with powers to 
overview various sectors, integrated enforcement 
can also ensure inter-sectoral consistency. Another 
benefit is the ability of the integrated authority to 
create better teams by combining experts who have 
relevant knowledge but diverse backgrounds, such 
as lawyers, economists, engineers and technicians. 
Moreover, multifunctional authorities can provide 
greater legal certainty to market players.  
However, the participants pointed out that if 
combining competition and consumer protection 
is already problematic, then integrating further 
functions is certainly going to raise even more 
difficulties, since these authorities may sometimes 
have extremely different points of view. This is 
because the objectives of competition and the 
sectoral regulators are not always compatible, which 
can compromise the effectiveness of both regimes 
when implemented by an integrated authority. 
Some participants referred to the financial sector 
as an example: they pointed out that, in terms 
of objectives, financial stability will most likely 
be given priority over competition in cases of 
conflict, even if consumers will have to pay the 
price. Another argument against the integration of 
sectoral regulation within the competition authority 
is linked to the danger of nationalising competition 
policy, as the infiltration of political issues could 
jeopardise the achievement of competition.  
With respect to sectoral regulators, a particularly 
acute problem is that of regulatory capture. However, 
it was pointed out that the risk of regulatory 
capture may actually be diluted when competition 
and regulatory functions are integrated within 
one authority. This can, for example, be achieved 
if the staff is encouraged to move across different 
departments of the authority. However, the extent to 
which this type of risk can be effectively minimised 
may also depend on the number of sectors that fall 
under the supervision of the integrated authority. 
Participants also stressed the importance of 
independence. It is commonly assumed that 
competition and regulatory authorities should be 
independent when they perform their functions. 
However, since the degree of independence enjoyed 
by competition and regulatory authorities may differ, 
the inclusion of regulators in the merged entity can 
have a negative impact on the independence of the 
competition authority.  
Having reflected on the advantages and disadvantages 
of various institutional settings, participants 
recalled that integration is not the only solution 
and that coordination should also be evaluated. To 
determine whether a coordination or integration 
model better suits the needs of a particular 
jurisdiction, a comprehensive evaluation should 
be carried out. Another conclusion that emerged 
during the discussion was that, irrespective of the 
institutional design chosen in a given jurisdiction, 
there are some key ingredients that lead to success. 
It was pointed out that, according to Hyman and 
Kovacic,2 for an institutional design to be successful 
2. David Hyman and William Kovacic (2013), ‘Institutional 
Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition 
Law’, vol. 81(5) Fordham Law Review, pp. 2163-2174.
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it has to ensure policy coherence, credibility, 
adequate capacity, resilience (understood, among 
other things, as the ability to adapt the organisation 
to what is happening around it) and cohesion. The 
attendees agreed that bringing different authorities 
under one roof does not in itself mean integration: 
for integration to be meaningful and effective, it is 
necessary to prevent internal silos.  
Finally, the participants also reflected that these 
institutional permutations are taking place in the 
middle of the ‘digital revolution’. As disruptive 
innovations change markets and consumers’ 
behaviours, various authorities are increasingly 
confronted with a plethora of questions that are 
related to the regulation of the Internet world. These 
developments call for more expertise and possibly 
for further integration and coordination among 
different authorities. 
 2. Competition authorities and advocacy 
In most cases, the enforcement of competition law 
by competition authorities concerns the overview 
of private conduct, such as the abuse of dominant 
position, anti-competitive mergers, vertical 
restraints, or various horizontal forms of cooperation. 
In some circumstances, however, competition can be 
hindered also by public regulatory intervention and 
rule making. While such intervention may often be 
warranted and justified, in some cases it may actually 
impede competition by going beyond what is strictly 
necessary in order to prevent anticompetitive effects. 
Accordingly, the next issue that raised lively debate 
was whether NCAs are the right actors to carry 
out advocacy work, and if not the NCAs, then who 
should be entrusted with such a task.  Since most 
advocacy is done in the context of regulated sectors, 
it was suggested that perhaps advocacy should be 
carried out by regulatory authorities instead. Some 
participants remarked that governments with well 
developed competition impact assessments do 
not necessarily need competition authorities to do 
advocacy work.  
The main reason that competition authorities 
undertake advocacy work is that such activities 
pursue the interests of consumers. However, as 
some participants pointed out, enforcement, and 
not advocacy, is a top priority for a competition 
authority. Advocacy, seen as enforcement, however, 
is very appealing to the competition authorities as 
it offers a high rate of success, as well as clear and 
visible results. An irresistible temptation to turn 
competition advocacy into enforcement is further 
compounded by the fact that conducting market 
investigation is easier than investigating a case. 
Moreover, policy advocacy may provide quantifiable 
and broad ex-ante impact, while the impact of 
enforcement is hard to quantify.  On the other 
hand, through ex-post enforcement the authority 
can at least compare prices, whereas, in the case of 
impact assessment, the authority can only obtain an 
approximation or a forecast of a possible outcome.  
Participants also briefly discussed the catalogue 
of advocacy tools, which typically include market 
investigations, competition impact assessment and 
opinions on legislation. Market investigations, for 
example, may lead to the adoption of decisions that 
are addressed to undertakings or recommendations 
for law reform, as happened in the UK in respect 
of the British Airports Authority (BAA) or with the 
OECD competition assessment in Greece.
The discussion on advocacy revealed that an 
important question is that of getting the balance 
right. While there is always a temptation to seek 
more power, competition authorities should 
carefully consider how much power they actually 
want to have. Enhanced advocacy powers certainly 
imply more political power, which, however, raises 
the question of a potential deficit in accountability. 
Advocacy powers also risk distracting the 
competition authority from its core objectives 
and raise the question of how non-competition 
considerations should be factored in.  For example, 
impact assessments do not focus only on competition, 
but take into consideration many other public 
interest values, such as social, fiscal, environmental 
considerations. Furthermore, advocacy and policy-
making by competition authorities imply the use 
of resources that are withdrawn from enforcement, 
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unless the budget of the competition authority is 
increased accordingly. 
Some participants expressed scepticism about 
legislative advocacy, as the risk of getting things 
wrong is high. In cases where there is doubt about 
the effects of a given legislation, it is important 
to inform the public at the outset that there will 
be a review and that some modifications may be 
necessary.  
3.Settlements and remedies imposed by NCAs 
The role of NCAs in the enforcement of EU 
competition rules has been significantly 
strengthened with the introduction of the power to 
negotiate settlements and to impose remedies. These 
tools have enriched the toolbox that is available 
to national competition authorities with a view to 
improving the enforcement of EU competition rules 
and also to increasing their uniform application. 
The common goal of settlements and remedies is to 
allow for a better allocation of resources, so that the 
authorities can concentrate on the most important 
cases. In particular, the aims are to increase the 
efficiency of the proceedings, to release human 
resources to pursue other violations, to increase the 
level of detection and effectiveness, all of which are 
relevant to ensuring that these instruments have 
a deterrent effect. While settlements apply only in 
the cases involving cartels, commitments should 
not apply to cases involving the most serious forms 
of violation of competition law, such as cartels. 
Accordingly, commitments and settlements have 
different scopes of application. 
Participants noted that practically all NCAs have the 
power to adopt commitment decisions. However, 
they also pointed out that this is a discretionary 
power and therefore, competition authorities are 
under no obligation to accept commitments. When 
assessing proposed commitments, the authority 
should verify whether they are addressing the main 
concern in the conduct or the transaction being 
investigated. Some participants pointed to the lack 
of a uniform approach at the national level in respect 
of how commitments should be used. For example, 
according to an Italian court, commitments should 
not apply to conducts whose effects have already 
materialised.  
Some participants remarked that while 
commitments offer a number of benefits, they 
also have a detrimental effect, to the extent that 
they make case law less clear. As the recourse to 
commitments increases, there is less jurisprudence 
and as jurisprudence becomes truncated, it does not 
give much guidance to private firms.
Participants then reflected on the role and the use 
of settlements. It was noted that settlements had 
become a successful tool at the EU level. Since 2010, 
the Commission has accepted commitments in 19 
cases. The rationale behind this instrument is that its 
use should increase procedural economies, thereby 
allowing competition authorities to direct their 
limited resources to other cases that require more 
in-depth investigation. Various attendees stressed 
that while procedural economy is a valid objective, 
it is important to strike the correct balance between 
this and other equally valid objectives, such as the 
right to due process. 
Participants also discussed fragmentation at the 
national level in terms of the possibility to settle in 
cartel cases, as well as the extent to which a fine could 
be reduced. Some pointed to the risk of treating 
the same conduct differently, such as transnational 
cartels, which, in turn, could jeopardise legal 
certainty. 
A lack of full convergence has also been observed 
in respect of remedies. Remedies must bring an 
infringement to an end, but, more importantly, they 
should eliminate the effects of the conduct being 
investigated. For behavioural remedies, the list is 
open, and can include the granting of licenses for 
IP rights upon non-discriminatory conditions, 
enabling access to specific infrastructures upon 
non-discriminatory conditions, amending a 
contract, or guaranteeing a supply to other firms or 
customers. Structural remedies can be imposed only 
if behavioural remedies are ineffective, and only 
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after the authority has obtained an opinion from 
the undertaking. In this sense, remedies bear some 
resemblance to the commitments procedure where 
NCAs always have to discuss how to eliminate the 
effects of a given conduct or transaction. While 
most of the NCAs have the powers to impose 
both structural and behavioural remedies, some 
authorities can only impose behavioural remedies. 
Many participants agreed that increased or full 
convergence at the national level would limit the 
risk of divergent treatments in cases where there are 
parallel investigations before different NCAs, thereby 
strengthening legal certainty for undertakings. 
The participants also reflected on advocacy in 
the context of disruptive innovations, which 
affect many completely different markets. While 
such innovations have the potential to bring 
significant benefits, they are not welcome equally 
by everyone, and in particular by the incumbent 
market players, whose position is challenged, and, 
in some cases, completely eroded. Most typically, 
disruptive innovations raise concerns in areas such 
as employment, public safety, health, and consumer 
protection. Given these concerns, many participants 
agreed that competition authorities can play an 
important role by using the available advocacy 
tools to ensure that regulations that are necessary 
to address legitimate public concerns do not restrict 
competition more than is strictly necessary.  
The attendees then looked at some of the recent 
examples of the use of advocacy tools in the context 
of disruptive innovation. Many competition 
authorities around the world have, in fact, already 
done some advocacy work in areas that are affected 
by disruptive innovation. Most advocacy work 
concerned the transport sector, and, in particular, 
taxis affected by Uber and the accommodation 
sector, which has been affected by players such as 
Airbnb.  
4. Quantifying NCAs enforcement results and 
setting fines
Participants remarked that even if today competition 
laws tend to be very comparable, institutional 
traditions and designs often differ to a lesser 
or greater extent, thereby leading to different 
treatments of otherwise identical infringements 
and to different approaches in relation to how to 
quantify the enforcement activities of NCAs. The 
key questions that emerged during the discussion 
are whether all NCAs should be required to perform 
impact assessment of their interventions; what are 
the areas in which the approaches are different, and 
whether there is a need to harmonise the way in 
which impact assessments are carried out. 
Participants recalled that, in 2014, the OECD 
published a ‘Guide for helping competition 
authorities assess the expected impact of their 
activities’.3 The Guide suggested that NCAs should 
regularly carry out impact assessments so as to 
calculate the benefits of their enforcement activities 
in terms of the improvement of consumers’ welfare. 
In particular, NCAs could elaborate reliable 
statistics in this regard by looking at the turnover 
of the firms that are affected by the decision, as well 
as at the price over-charge which is caused by the 
infringement and its duration. If detailed data for 
each case investigated are not available, the NCAs 
could estimate the price over-charge as between 3% 
for merger decisions and 10% for cartel cases. On the 
other hand, the average duration of the infringement 
would be between 2 and 3 years. According to the 
Survey published by the OECD, together with the 
Guide, NCAs only occasionally performed such 
impact assessment, especially in cartel cases.
Participants also debated on the existence of the 
divergent approaches adopted by NCAs in the 
process of setting fines. For instance, while the 
principle that the fine is calculated on the basis 
of the firm’s turnover throughout the period of 
the infringement is common to every NCA, the 
3. OECD (2014), Guide for helping competition authorities 
assess the expected impact of their activities.
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To conclude, participants agreed that further 
convergence is welcome, both in relation to how 
NCAs carry out impact assessments of their 
enforcement activities and the manner in which 
they set fines. 
‘maximum’ percentage of the relevant turnover 
taken into consideration varies from country to 
country, even within the EU. For instance, while the 
EU Commission and other NCAs (e.g., Germany 
and Portugal) consider 30% to be the maximum 
turnover, the UK Competition and Market 
Authority opted for only 10% as the maximum 
turnover. Furthermore, participants noticed that 
a major difference among NCAs concerns the role 
of competition law compliance programmes in 
calculating the fine.4  For example, the German 
NCA and the EU Commission do not grant any fine 
reduction to firms that have implemented antitrust 
compliance programmes. In contrast, the French 
and Italian NCAs have recently mentioned in their 
guidelines on fines calculation that the existence 
of a compliance programme should be considered 
a mitigating factor, which, in turn, may justify a 
reduction in a fine.  
4. In this regard, see the previous ENTraNCE Policy Brief 
‘Antitrust Compliance Programs in Europe: Status Quo 
and Challenges Ahead’. The text of the document is avail-
able at:  http://www.eui.eu/Projects/ENTRANCE/Work-
shop/AntitrustCompliance.aspx (accessed on 24.6.2016).
